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 Abstract:  On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake and 38-meter 
tsunami destroyed Tokyo Electric's Fukushima nuclear power complex.  The disaster was 
not a high-damage, low-probability event.  It was a high-damage, high-probability event.  
Massive earthquakes and tsunami assault the coast every century.   
 Tokyo Electric built its reactors as it did because it would not pay the full cost of 
a melt-down anyway.  Given the limited liability at the heart of corporate law, it could 
externalize the cost of running reactors.  In most industries, firms rarely risk tort damages 
so enormous they cannot pay them.  In nuclear power, "unpayable" potential liability is 
routine.  Privately owned companies bear the costs of an accident only up to the fire-sale 
value of their net assets.  Beyond that point, they pay nothing -- and the damages from a 
nuclear disaster easily soar past that point. 
 Government ownership could eliminate this moral hazard -- but it would replace 
it with problems of its own.  Unfortunately, the electoral dynamics in wealthy modern 
democracies combine to replicate nearly perfectly the moral hazard inherent in private 
ownership.  Private firms will build reactors on fault lines.  And so will governments.  
 
 
 
 
 * Mitsubishi Professor of Japanese Legal Studies, Harvard University.  I received helpful 
comments and suggestions from Ron Harris, Curtis Milhaupt, Ariel Porat, Frances Rosenbluth, Richard 
Samuels, Doran Teichman, Frank Upham, Mark West, and participants in a conference at Tel Aviv 
University.  I gratefully acknowledge the generous financial support of the Harvard Law School. I would 
also like to thank the John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business at Harvard Law School for 
the exposure they provide me through their discussion paper series. 
Ramseyer - 2 
 
Why Power Companies Build Nuclear Reactors on Fault Lines: 
The Case of Japan 
 
© 2011 J. Mark Ramseyer. All Rights Reserved 
 
 
 "We can only work on precedent, and there was no precedent," recalled the 
engineer who ran the Fukushima Daiichi complex in the 1990s.  The massive earthquake 
and tsunami along the Sanriku coast on March 11, 2011, would throw three of the six 
reactors at the complex into melt-down mode.  "When I headed for the plant, the thought 
of a tsunami never crossed my mind."1
 The New York Times took the Fukushima director's words at face value. 
"Japanese engineers working on nuclear plants continued to predict what they believed 
were maximum earthquakes based on records," it explained.  That approach "did not take 
into account serious uncertainties like faults that had not been discovered or earthquakes 
that were gigantic but rare."
     
2
 Who could they be kidding? 
  By way of large past earthquakes, all it could find was the 
magnitude 8.3 Jogan quake from 869 A.D.   
 This is not what we lawyers call "rocket science," and the last earthquake in 
northeastern Japan was not the 869 Jogan disaster.  The Sanriku coast is famously like 
California:  big earthquakes hit it often, hit it regularly, and hit it with massive tsunami.3
 Date Magnitude Epicenter Tsunami   . 
 
 1611 8.1 N39.0 E144.4 15-25 meters 
 1793 8.4 N38.5 E144.5 4-5 meters 
 1896 8.0 N39.5 E144.0 28.7 meters 
 1933 8.1 N39.2 E144.5 38.2 meters 
 2011 9.0 N38.3 E142.4 38.9 meters 
 Coming about 80 years after the last spectacular quake, the March 2011 
earthquake resembled a Tokyo commuter train:  faultlessly on schedule.  It was bigger 
than quakes in the past, but its predecessors had been plenty big too.  And it brought with 
it a tsunami almost exactly the height of its predecessor eight decades before. 
 As long ago as 1934, Akitune Imamura of the Tokyo Imperial University 
Seismological Institute could write that "the eastern coast of the locality popularly known 
as the San-Riku (three-Riku) district ... is well known from historic times as the region 
frequently visited by tunami."  What is more, he continued, "it is most notorious in this 
country, if not in the whole world."4
                                                 
1 Onishi & Glanz, Japanese Rules for Nuclear Plants Relied on Old Science, N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 
2011. 
 
2 Id. 
3 See T. Usami, Nihon higai jishin soran, [416]-2001 [Materials for Copmprehensive List of 
Destructive Earthquakes in Japan, [416]-2001] (2003); T. Utsu, et al., eds., Jishin no jiten [Encyclopedia of 
Earthquakes] App. II (2d ed., 2010); Utsu, Nihon fukin no M6.0 ijo no jishin oyobi higai jishin no hyo:  
1885 nen - 1980 nen [Table of Magnitude 6.0 or Higher Earthquakes Near Japan and of Earthquakes 
Causing Damage], 57Jishin kenkyujo iho 401 (1982). 
4 Imamura, Past Tsunamis of the Sanriku Coast, 11 Japanese J. Astronomy & Geophysics 79, 79 
(1934). 
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 Every century a massive (magnitude 8+) earthquake hits the Sanriku coast, and 
every century it brings a devastating (typically 20+ meters) tsunami.  Any seismologist 
knew this.  Any Sanriku fisherman knew this.  And blithely, Tokyo Electric placed ten 
nuclear reactors on the coast. 
 Blithely -- but rationally and not recklessly.  Tokyo Electric is a corporation.  
Necessarily, corporate law caps its effective liability at the fire-sale value of its net assets.  
Because that maximum falls far short of the social costs of a nuclear melt-down, Tokyo 
Electric will not pay the full cost of running these reactors.  Instead, it can use the law to 
externalize the cost of doing business.  It and the other power companies built nuclear 
reactors that could not survive expected earthquakes.  But they did not do so foolishly.  
They did so because the limited liability at the heart of the corporate law made it 
profitable to do so. 
 Government ownership would seem to eliminate this moral hazard.  If the 
government as owner earns the returns to nuclear power generation, it also bears the costs.  
But only "seem to eliminate" -- for the electoral dynamics of modern wealthy 
democracies replicate almost exactly the moral hazard behind Fukushima.  Combine 
regulated electricity rates, NIMBY politics, and progressive income taxation -- and 
government ownership will give voters incentives as mis-aligned as anything faced by 
Tokyo Electric.  
 In the article that follows, I use nuclear power in Japan as a case study of moral 
hazard under private and government ownership.  In Section I.A., I survey electricity 
generation in Japan.  In I.B., I explain the basics of nuclear power, and in I.C. outline its 
regulation in Japan.  In Section II, I describe the litigation over nuclear power, and in 
Section III I discuss the moral hazard involved.  The explanation I posit is not specific to 
Japan -- but neither is the phenomenon of dangerously built and operated reactors. 
 
I.  Nuclear Power in Japan 
A.  The Power Industry: 
 Japan does not have much coal.  It does not have much oil, and it does not have 
much natural gas.  It does have steep rivers, and it does dam them to produce electricity.  
But the rivers do not suffice.  All told, hydroelectric plants produce only 7 percent of the 
electric power Japan needs.5
 Lacking fossil fuels, Japan imports massively.  Yet this reliance on imported fuel 
leaves it vulnerable in the extreme.  It felt this vulnerability most painfully during the 
1970s.  In 1973, the principal Arab oil producers announced a boycott of countries that 
supported Israel.  They included Japan on their list.  Oil prices quadrupled, and Japanese 
GDP growth promptly turned negative.
    
6
 Yet the 1973 embargo could not cause Japan to turn nuclear -- because Japan had 
already turned.  Already in the 1950s, the government had started planning for nuclear 
power.  Under its leadership, the electric power companies formed a joint venture and 
launched a commercial nuclear power plant in 1966.   
   
                                                 
5  World Nuclear Ass'n, Nuclear Power in Japan, Feb. 24, 2011.  www.world-
nuclear.org/info/inf79.html. 
6  Shakai jitsujo deeta zuroku [Social Data in Figures] (2011).  
www2.ttcn.ne.jp/honkawa/4400.html. 
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 The Arab embargo did cause the Japanese government to tighten its nuclear focus.  
It had worries enough protecting its oil tankers from pirates in the Malacca Straits.  It did 
not need to mortgage its foreign policy to an Arab cartel.  And so, Japan built reactors 
(see Table 1).  Other rich countries built them too, of course.  But from its 50+ reactors, 
Japan new obtains nearly 30 percent of its electricity.7
 [Insert Table 1 about here.] 
  
 The Japanese government does not own these reactors.  Neither does it itself dam 
rivers, burn coal, or build commercial reactors.  Instead, privately owned and operated 
firms produce the energy.  In 2010, ten utility companies generated the bulk of the 
electricity used (see Table 2).  All ten firms listed their stock on the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange.  Tokyo Electric was the largest.  As of January 2011, it had a market 
capitalization of 3.2 trillion yen (at 80 yen/$, about $40 billion).   
 [Insert Table 2 about here.] 
 
B.  Nuclear Power: 
 1.  Thermal reactors. -- Consider nuclear reactors a complicated way to boil water.  
To produce electricity from uranium, reactors split the atom, radiate heat, generate steam, 
and spin a turbine.  The reactors first cause neutrons to collide with 235U.  The 235U atom 
absorbs the neutron, and divides into two smaller atoms.  In the process, it releases 
energy (to create steam), gamma radiation (to cause radiation sickness), and free neutrons 
(to collide with other uranium atoms).  
 Before neighboring 235U atoms will absorb the free neutrons, a thermal reactor 
must slow the neutrons.  To do so, most modern reactors hold their fuel assemblies in 
water -- hence the term "light water reactors."  The technology does economize on 
shipping raw materials:  one ton of uranium generates as much electricity as 17,000 to 
20,000 tons of coal.  But most uranium will not work as fuel.  Most of it comes in the 
stable 238U form.  To create a chain reaction in a reactor, a power company must first 
"enrich" that 238U with the unstable 235U isotope to about 3 to 8 percent.8
 
   
 2.  Breeder reactors. -- From the start, the Japanese government planned not to 
stop with "thermal nuclear reactors" but to move to "fast breeder reactors" (FBRs).9
                                                 
7 In May 2011, the German government decided to decommission all of its reactors by 2022.  See 
Bernd Radowitz & Jan Hromadko, Germany Moves Forward on Nuclear Exit, Wall St. J., June 6, 2011; 
Kamei, Fukushima daiichi genpatsu jikogo no yoso [Predicting What Will Follow the Fukushima Daiichi 
Nuclear Reactor Accident], 1880 Toki no horei 41, 43 (2011).  In the same month, Chubu Electric agreed 
to stop the operation of its Hamaoka plant, pending review of its seismological risks.  See Mari Iwata & 
Mitsuru Obe, Japanese Power Firm to Shut Nuclear Plant, Wall St. J., May 10, 2011. 
  
FBRs generate more fissile material than they consume (hence the term "breeder"; 
because they do not slow their neutrons in water, they are "fast").  As a result, they 
promised to let Japan skirt the problems caused by its lack of uranium.   
8  World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Power Reactor Characteristics (2010), www.world-
nuclear.org/about/; Karam, How Do Fast Breeder Reactors Differ from Regular Nuclear Power Plants?, 
Scientific American, July 17, 2006, at 13. 
9 See E.g., Pickett, Japan's Nuclear Energy Policy:  From Firm Commitment to Difficult Dilemma 
Addressing Growing Stocks of Plutonium, Program Delays, Domestic Opposition and International 
Pressure, 30 Energy Policy 1337, 1337-39 (2002); R. Samuels, The Business of the Japanese State 236 
(1987); Suzuki, supra note, at 53.   
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 FBRs burn "mixed oxide" (MOX) fuel.  Typically, MOX includes about four-
fifths uranium dioxide and one-fifth plutonium dioxide (PuO2).  Rather than the rare 235U, 
FBRs use the fissile 239Pu.  Plutonium is extraordinarily dangerous, but for the power 
companies it is almost-readily available.  They can obtain it from two sources.  Most 
obviously, FBRs produce it.  A utility can take an FBR's spent fuel to a "reprocessing 
plant," extract the plutonium, and use it to run the next reactor.10
 Second, old bombs contain it.  Both the U.S. and Russia have large stockpiles of 
nuclear weapons, and these bombs have plutonium warheads.  Take the warheads to a 
reprocessing plant, mix the weapons-grade plutonium with uranium, and the utilities will 
have MOX.
  
11
 The utilities can also burn the MOX in their light-water thermal reactors.  Modify 
the equipment, and even these thermal reactors will run on MOX.  The reactor at Fugen 
(Fukui prefecture) was the first in the world to do so.
  
12
 FBRs aggravate the proliferation problem.  The reactors produce plutonium and 
the reprocessing plants mix it into MOX, but terrorists and governments can also load it 
into bombs.  In 1974, India used the plutonium from its FBR to build a "peaceful nuclear 
explosion."  France uses its FBR to create weapons-grade plutonium.  The more FBRs, 
the more chance a rogue regime or terrorist will steal plutonium for a bomb.  In part for 
that reason, the U.K., Germany, and the U.S. have all abandoned their FBR projects.
  Within the Fukushima Daiichi 
complex, the No. 3 reactor (which, like reactors 1 and 2 spiraled into a partial melt-down) 
burned plutonium-enriched MOX.   
13
 And FBRs do explode.  Because water would decelerate neutrons in the way that 
would obstruct the FBR's chain reaction, FBRs cool their fuel with liquid sodium.  
Unfortunately, as one commentator put it, sodium "reacts violently with water and burns 
if exposed to air."  As a result, any leak in the cooling mechanism can cause "a major 
sodium-water fire."
   
14
 The reprocessing plants that accompany FBRs create their own problems besides.  
To turn a FBR's spent fuel into MOX, a utility must "reprocess" the fuel.  Unfortunately, 
that procedure presents its own risk of accidents and proliferation.  Sensing those 
problems, President Jimmy Carter stopped all spent-fuel reprocessing in the U.S. in 
1977.
  What is more, that sodium can be highly radioactive.   
15
 These are serious problems, but Japan has persevered.  It has built two FBRs.  It 
placed the Joyo experimental FBR in service in 1977, and the Monju FBR in service in 
1994.  It built one reprocessing plant in Tokai-mura, mid-way between the Fukushima 
complex and Tokyo, and a second plant in Rokkasho on the northern tip of Honshu island.   
 
 
                                                 
10 See, e.g., Karam; von Hippel, Overview:  The Rise and Fall of Plutonium Breeder Reactors, in 
T. Cochran, et al., eds., Fast Breeder Reactor Programs:  History and Status, International Panel on Fissile 
Materials, Feb. 2010, at 1; Khodarev, Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactors, 20 IAEA Bull. 29 (1978). 
11 Becker & Broad, New Doubts about Turning Plutonium into a Fuel, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 2011. 
12 WNA, 2011, supra note, at 4. 
13 von Hippel, 2010, supra note, at 10-11. 
14 von Hippel, 2010, supra note, at 8. 
15 See Karam, supra note. 
Ramseyer - 6 
 
C.  Regulatory Structure 
 1.  Licensing. -- The Ministry of Economy, Trade & Industry (METI; formerly 
MITI) licenses reactors.  With a unitary (rather than federal) structure and a 
parliamentary (rather than presidential) government, Japan seems to present power 
companies with a more stream-lined process than the U.S.  In 1995, Linda Cohen, 
Mathew McCubbins and Frances Rosenbluth cited this institutional structure to explain 
the greater use of nuclear power in Japan.  "U.S. utility companies have all but 
abandoned nuclear power," they wrote; "Japanese nuclear capacity has mushroomed."  
U.S. utilities face "myriad bureaucratic hurdles [to] overcome to build new nuclear power 
facilities"; Japanese firms "face relatively few such impediments." 16
 A power company begins the Japanese licensing process by picking a site.
   
17
 Reactors bring massive subsidies, jobs, and tax revenue.  In 2004 METI published 
a pamphlet to generate support for new nuclear plants.
  It 
completes an environmental impact statement.  It assembles its technical plans.  It 
contacts METI, and the ministry consults with the Nuclear Power Commission and the 
Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC).  If METI likes the application, the power company 
starts building.  When finished, it submits the reactor to yet more inspections and testing.  
Typically, it gives local residents a chance to speak, and the popularly elected prefectural 
governor has some say as well.  
18
 But if the Japanese government presents utilities with a more streamlined process 
than the U.S., it does not present an effortless process.  METI may promise communities 
massive subsidies, but many refuse the money.  Sometimes they hold local votes on a 
proposed reactor, even when the results do not formally bind.  Sometimes their governor 
blocks construction.  Sometimes they sue the power company and METI.  Opponents 
usually win the local elections, but almost never win the lawsuits.  Even if they 
  From the initial environmental 
impact statement to operation ten years later, it promised a community total subsidies of 
39.1 billion yen -- this on top of the construction jobs the reactors would bring.  Once 
operational, it promised additional subsidies and revenues over ten years of 50.2 billion 
yen.  To communities that took nuclear waste sites, it offered even more. 
                                                 
16 Cohen, McCubbins & Rosenbluth, The Politics of Nuclear Power in Japan and the United States, 
in P. Cowhey & M. McCubbins, eds., Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States 177, 177-78 
(1995).   
17 See generally Cohen, McCubbins & Rosenbluth, supra note, at 182-83; Shuto, "Minshu jishu 
kokai" ni hansuru tetsuzuki [Procedures Violating "Democracy, Autonomy, and Openness"], 417 Hogaku 
seminaa 34 (1989); Genshiryoku hatsuden gijutsu kiko, Genshiryoku hatsudensho no anzen shinsa [The 
Safety Inspection of Nuclear Reactor Generating Plants] (2003).  The process follows statutes relating to 
the electrical power industry generally and to the nuclear power industry specifically:  primarily, the Kaku 
genryo busshitsu, kaku nenryo busshitsu oyobi genshiryo no kisei ni kansuru horitsu [Law Regarding the 
Regulation of the Quality of Nuclear Raw Materials, Nuclear Fuel and Nuclear Reactors], Law No. 166 of 
1957, Secs. 23, 24, 37, and the Denki jigyo ho [Electrical Business Act], Law No. 170 of 1964, Secs. 47, 49, 
51, 52, 54, 107, and the Kankyo eikyo hyoka ho [Environmental Impact Evaluation Act], Law No. 81 of 
1997.  The process is still very much like the early 1990s process that Cohen, McCubbins & Rosenbluth 
described. 
18 Keizai sangyo sho shigen enerugiii cho, Dengen ricchi seido no gaiyo -- Heisei 15 nendo 
daikaiseigo no aratana kofukin seido [An Outline of the Electrical Generating Sites -- The New Subsidy 
System After the Great Revision of 2003], Mar. 2004, www.dengen.or.jp. 
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eventually lose in court, though, they almost always impose enormous delays (see 
Section II., below). 
  
 2.  Earthquake safety. -- When considering a license application, METI evaluates 
a reactor's ability to withstand an earthquake.  The NSC sets the relevant standards.19  
They vary by location, but in 2006 the NSC revised them to make them more demanding 
and explicitly to include tsunami risk.20
 Whether a structure will survive an earthquake depends on a wide variety of 
factors.  Popular writers typically give an earthquake's "magnitude" -- a number on the 
logarithmic Richter scale.  The number represents the amount of energy the earthquake 
releases.  In fact, the danger to a structure depends less on the magnitude itself than on 
how the ground moves.  That movement obviously depends on the quake's "magnitude," 
but also on its direction, its depth, and the quality of the local soil.   
   
 Engineers often give peak ground acceleration in gals (cm/sec2; Galileos).  Yet 
even peak acceleration measures the risk to a building only imperfectly.  Structural 
damage depends as much on the duration of any acceleration as on its peak rate.  What is 
more, buildings vibrate at a distinctive "harmonic frequency," and damage also depends 
on how closely that frequency matches the frequency of the shock waves.21
 That said, as a crude proxy for the potential damage take the popular Richter scale.  
The U.S. Geological Service estimates the magnitude of all major earthquakes since the 
9th century.
 
22
 
  By this measure, the most intense was the 1960 earthquake in Chile with a 
magnitude of 9.5.  The 1964 Alaskan quake had a magnitude of 9.2.  The 2004 
Indonesian earthquake had a magnitude of 9.1.  And the March 2011 9.0 Japanese 
earthquake was tied for fourth place with three others.  The 1923 Tokyo quake that left 
105,000 people dead or missing had a magnitude of 7.9.   
 3.  Liability. -- For damages caused by an accident at a nuclear power plant, the 
plant's owner is liable by special statute.23
                                                 
19 Genshiryoku anzen iinkai, Hatsuden yo genshiryo shisetsu ni kansuru taishin sekkei shinsa 
shishin [Inspection Manual on Earthquake Resistance Design at Electrical Generating Nuclear Reactor 
Facilities], Sept. 19, 2006. 
  By this act, the owner is strictly liable for the 
full amount of damages.  To recover, plaintiffs must demonstrate only the causal 
connection between the accident and their damages (Sec. II.E., below).  The Act 
20  Kawai, Higashi nihon daishinsai ni miru genshiryoku hatsudensho no taishin anzensei no 
kakuho no arikata ni tsuite [Regarding the Way to Insure the Seismological Safety of Nuclear Reactors, as 
Seen in the Great Eastern Japan Earthquake], 83-5 Horitsu jiho 79 (2011). 
21 Qamar, Earthquake Hazards in the Pacific Northwest (2008), www.crew.org/ep/hazards.html; J. 
Singh, 2011.  Characterization of Ground Motion for Severity and Damage Potential (2011), 
nisee.berkeley.edu/lessons/singh.html. 
22  USGS, Historic World Earthquakes (2011), 
earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/historical_mag.php. 
23  Genshiryoku songai no baisho ni kansuru horitsu [Law Regarding the Compensation for 
Nuclear Damages], Law No. 147 of 1961, Sec. 3; Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science & 
Technology, Genshiryoku songai baisho seido [Damage Compensation System in Nuclear Power] (2011), 
www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/anzenkakuho/baisho/index.html (hereinafter MECSST). 
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preempts claims under the general tort damage provisions of the Civil Code,24 and other 
firms (like an operator's parent corporation) bear no liability.25
 To facilitate payment, a plant's operator must maintain both an insurance contract 
with a private insurer, and a separate contract with the government.  Both contracts must 
cover liability up to 120 billion yen per reactor.
 
26  The private insurer will cover most 
accidents.  The contract with the government will cover those accidents caused by events 
(like earthquakes and tsunami) that private insurers typically exclude.  Should all this 
prove insufficient, the statute also authorizes the government to provide additional 
assistance (obviously, the government could choose to do so without that statute 
anyway).27
 For "extremely massive natural disasters" the reactor's operator is not liable.  This 
is not a phrase the courts have yet interpreted.  Whether the March 11 earthquake 
exempts Tokyo Electric thus remains unclear. 
   
 
II.  Nuclear Power and the Courts 
A.  Introduction: 
 Although power companies still find it easier to license new reactors in Japan than 
in the U.S., the process is no longer as clean as when Cohen, McCubbins & Rosenbluth 
wrote in the early 1990s.  People near the plants regularly sue.  They manipulate land 
titles to prevent power companies from building.  They challenge the licenses.   They try 
to enjoin the plants from operating.   
 In the end, nuclear opponents almost always lose in court.  Yet even when they 
lose, they introduce massive delays -- sometimes, decades.  Delays matter.  In Japan as 
elsewhere, time is money.   
 
B. Fukushima:  
 1.  Introduction. -- Take Tokyo Electric and its now-infamous Fukushima reactors.  
The firm located the Daiichi (the name means "Number One") plant along the eastern 
coast of Japan, 140 miles north of Tokyo.  By March 2011, the plant had six reactors with 
a total capacity of 4,546 MWe.  It located the Daini (meaning "Number Two") plant 7 
miles south.  There, it maintained another four reactors with 4,268 MWe capacity.   
 Tokyo Electric placed the first of the Fukushima reactors (No. 1 at the Daiichi 
complex) in service in 1971.  With an expected life of 40 years, the reactor was in its last 
days.28
                                                 
24 Ibaragi kotsu, K.K. v. K.K. JCO, 1876 Hanrei jiho 34 (Tokyo D. Ct. Sept. 27, 2004), aff'd on 
other grounds, 1914 Hanrei jiho 95 (Tokyo High Ct. Sept. 21, 2005).  To same effect:  Kono v. K.K. JCO, 
2003 Hanrei jiho 67 (Mito D. Ct. Feb. 27, 2008). 
  It placed the last (No. 4 at Daini) in service in 1985.  When the March earthquake 
hit, the Daini reactors shut down without incident.  The tsunami reached only 7 meters 
25 E.g., Kono v. K.K. JCO, 2003 Hanrei jiho 67 (Mito D. Ct. Feb. 27, 2008). 
26  Genshiryoku songai baisho hosho keiyaku ni kansuru horitsu [Law Regarding the 
Supplementary Nuclear Power Damage Compensation Contract], Law No. 148 of 1961, Secs. 7, 8; 
MECSST, supra note..   
27 Nuclear Compensation Act, Sec. 16(a); Genshiryoku, 2006, supra note; MECSST, supra note. 
28  Digital World Portal, Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant, Mar. 18, 2011.  
edigitales.org/fukushima-nuclear-power-plant/ 
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high, and the quake brought peak acceleration rates of 196 to 305 gal.  These remained 
comfortably within the reactors' limits of 415 to 512 gal.   
 Tokyo Electric's problems occurred instead at the Daiichi complex.  The firm had 
designed its reactors to withstand peak horizontal acceleration of 415 to 489 gal.  It had 
anticipated a 5.7 meter tsunami.  In fact, the peak acceleration during the March 2011 
earthquake hit 550 gal, and the wave slammed the complex at 14-15 meters high.29
 
  
 2.  Landfill. -- Nuclear-power opponents had begun fighting the Fukushima 
reactors in court in the early 1970s.  In 1973, the governor of Fukushima licensed Tokyo 
Electric to fill part of the local bay.  The firm needed to do this to build the Daini 
complex.  Neighbors challenged the landfill license, and the court dismissed their claim 
for lack of standing.  They contested the safety of the nuclear plant, it noted, but the 
statute at stake did not concern reactor safety.  It concerned landfills.  They might well 
have standing to contest the reactor's operating license, but none to challenge the 
landfill.30
 
 
 3.  Reactor license. -- Opponents did contest Tokyo Electric's operating license -- 
for nearly two decades, all the way to the Supreme Court.  In 1975, about 400 neighbors 
to Daini sued METI's predecessor ministry over the reactor's license.  The trial took years.  
In 1984, the Fukushima District Court held that they had standing to challenge the license, 
and added that the government bore part of the burden of showing the rationality of its 
decision.  It concluded that the government had met its burden, and dismissed the case.31
 The Sendai High Court affirmed in 1990, and the Supreme Court in 1992:  the 
neighbors had standing to sue, but lost on the merits.
 
32
 
  To ensure their safety, the 
ministry had specifically considered earthquake risk.  To be sure, the district court noted 
magnitude 7.7 earthquakes in 1646 and 1938.  Given that Tokyo Electric had properly 
planned for a 7.7 quake, however, the reactor was safe.  The magnitude 8.0+ quakes that 
came every century?  Apparently, the courts defined them out of the relevant 
geographical area. 
 4.  Other suits. -- Neighbors fought the Fukushima complex through other suits 
too.  They bought stock in Tokyo Electric.  When the cooling system in one of the Daini 
reactors malfunctioned in 1989, they sued as shareholders to shut it down.  Only then, 
they argued, could the firm avoid irreparable harm to itself.   
                                                 
29 Tokyo Electric Power Co., Higashi Nihon daishinsai ni okeru genshiryoku hatsudensho no 
eikyo to genzai no jokyo ni tsuite [Regarding the Effect of the Great Eastern Japan Earthquake on the 
Nuclear Electrical Generating Plant and its Present Circumstances], May 2011, www.tepco.co.jp. 
30 Onoda v. Matsudaira, 894 Hanrei jiho 39 (Fukushima D. Ct. June 19, 1978). 
31 Onoda v. Okonogi, 1124 Hanrei jiho 34 (Fukushima D. Ct. July 23, 1984), aff'd, 1345 Hanrei 
jiho 33 (Sendai High Ct. Mar. 20, 1990), aff'd, 1441 Hanrei jiho 50 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 29, 1992); see generally 
Yasui, Genpatsu sosho ni okeru rissho sekinin [Burden of Proof in Nuclear Reactor Litigation], 2010 
Kyushu L. Assn. J. 33 (2010). 
32 Onoda v. Okonogi, 1345 Hanrei jiho 33 (Sendai High Ct. Mar. 20, 1990), aff'd, 1441 Hanrei 
jiho 50 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 29, 1992). 
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 The court dismissed their claim.  Whether to restart a damaged reactor was a 
question on which the firm's board could turn to specialists.  If those specialists thought it 
appropriate to restart the reactor, it could properly restart it.33
 When Tokyo Electric modified reactor 3 at the Daiichi plant to use plutonium-
enriched MOX, neighbors sued again.  Plutonium was dangerous, they argued.  They did 
not want it in their backyard.  They filed for an injunction, and in 2001 the court 
dismissed their claim:  MOX was safe.
 
34
 
 
C.  Reactor Licensing: 
 1.  Introduction. -- The Fukushima opinions typify Japanese anti-nuclear litigation.  
Neighbors sue, claiming a threat to their health.  They ask the court to shut down the 
reactor.  Provided they live close enough, the courts grant them standing.  They then 
dismiss on the merits:  the reactors are safe.   
 
 2.  Shiga. -- But not always.  One of the few (temporary) exceptions to this rule 
involved the Shiga reactor complex on the Japan Sea shore.  First, anti-nuclear activists 
sued to enjoin the operation of reactor 1.  In 1994, they won on standing and lost on the 
merits.  The district court noted the risk of powerful earthquakes, but held that the reactor 
could withstand them.  The high court and Supreme Court affirmed.35
 Activists then sued to enjoin reactor 2.  This time -- in 2006 -- the district court 
granted the injunction.  It recited some of the past earthquakes:  a magnitude 7.9 quake in 
745, 8.1 in 1586, 6.8 in 1729, 7.1 in 1858, 8.0 in 1891, 6.4 in 1892, 6.0 in 1933.  It 
discussed ground acceleration and harmonic frequency.  And where the agency had 
announced that the reactor needed to be able to withstand a magnitude 6.5 quake, the 
court disagreed.  The agency could not reasonably limit the reactor's potential exposure to 
so small an earthquake.
 
36
 The opinion did not last.  On appeal, the high court in 2009 held the reactor 
safe.
  
37
 
  The power company bore part of the burden of showing that the reactor was safe, 
but it met it.  The plaintiffs lost on the merits. 
 3.  Monju. -- The other (equally temporary) exception to the rule involved the 
Monju FBR.  Four Japanese firms (not utilities) organized a joint venture to build the 
reactor, and in 1980 applied for a permit.  They obtained it in 1983.  Opponents then sued 
MITI to void the permit.  The Fukui District Court dismissed their claim for lack of 
                                                 
33 Hirose v. Nasu, 1591 Hanrei jiho 3 (Tokyo D. Ct. Dec. 19, 1996), affirmed 1686 Hanrei jiho 33 
(Tokyo High Ct. Mar. 25, 1999). 
34 [No name given] v. Tokyo denryoku, K.K., 1775 Hanrei jiho 114 (Fukushima D. Ct. Mar. 23, 
2001) (Fukushima 1). 
35 Kawabe v. Hokuriku denryoku, K.K., 1515 Hanrei jiho 3 (Kanazawa D. Ct. Aug. 25, 1994), 
affirmed, 1656 Hanrei jiho 37 (Nagoya High Ct. Sept. 9, 1998), affirmed (Supreme Ct. Dec. 19, 2000). 
36 [No names given], 1930 Hanrei jiho 25 (Kanazawa D. Ct. Mar. 24, 2006). 
37 [No names given], 2045 Hanrei jiho 3 (Nagoya High Ct. Mar. 18, 2009), reversing (Kanazawa 
D. Ct. Mar. 24, 2006). 
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standing, but on appeal the Nagoya High Court granted standing to those nearest the plant.  
In 1992 the Supreme Court expanded the group with standing, and remanded the case.38
 Meanwhile, construction continued.  In 1991 the developers started testing the 
reactor, and by 1994 had launched a self-sustaining chain reaction.  By August of 1995 
they were generating electricity.  Promptly, however, a thermometer in the cooling 
system broke and ruptured the sodium heat transfer system.  A massive fire engulfed the 
room.  No one was injured and no radioactivity leaked, but the temperatures spiked so 
high that the steel melted.  The government shut down the reactor.
   
39
 With standing settled, the district court heard evidence on reactor safety.  It 
canvassed the history of earthquakes in the area, and concluded that the reactor was safe.  
The opponents appealed again, and in 2003 the Nagoya High Court reversed.  The safety 
studies were flawed and -- therefore -- the reactor's license was void.  Yet this order too 
did not last.  The defendants appealed to the Supreme Court, and two years later the 
Court reversed.  The safety study was fine, the administrative process had been 
reasonable, and the courts should defer to the agency.
  
40
 
   
 4.  Other plants. -- More typically, courts simply grant standing and dismiss on 
the merits from the outset.  Neighbors to the Onagawa reactor 100 miles north of 
Fukushima Daiichi sued to halt construction and enjoin operation.  As elsewhere, the 
courts held that they had standing, but decided against them on the merits:  the reactor 
was safe.41
 Neighbors similarly sued to challenge licenses for the Ikata reactor (Ehime 
prefecture), Tokai-mura reactor (Ibaragi), Takahama reactor (Fukui), Tomari-mura 
reactor (Hokkaido), and Kashiwazaki reactor (Niigata).  In each case, the courts held that 
they had standing to sue, but dismissed their claims.  In each case, the courts concluded 
that the reactors were safe.
   
42
                                                 
38 Isobe v. Takeshita, 1264 Hanrei jiho 31 (Fukui D. Ct. Dec. 25, 1987), reversed, 1322 Hanrei 
jiho 33 (Nagoya High Ct. July 19, 1989), modified, Tokioka v. Miyazawa, 1437 Hanrei jiho 29 (Sup Ct. 
Sept. 22, 1992). 
 
39 See Pickett, supra note, at 1342; Suzuki, supra note, at 54. 
40 [No name given], 1727 Hanrei jiho 33 (Fukui D. Ct. Mar. 22, 2000), reversed, 1818 Hanrei jiho 
3 (Nagoya High Ct. Jan. 27, 2003), reversed, 1909 Hanrei jiho 8 (Sup. Ct. May 30, 2005). 
41 Abe v. Tohoku denryoku, K.K., 1482 Hanrei jiho 3 (Sendai D. Ct. Jan. 31, 1994), affirmed, 
1680 Hanrei jiho 46 (Sendai High Ct. Mar. 31, 1999). 
42 Kawaguchi v. Fukuda, 891 Hanrei jiho 38 (Matsuyama D. Ct. Apr. 25, 1978)(Ikata), affirmed, 
Kawaguchi v. Murata, 1136 Hanrei jiho 3 (Takamatsu High Ct. Dec. 14, 1984), affirmed, Inoue v. 
Watanabe, 1441 Hanrei jiho 37 (Sup Ct. Oct. 29, 1992); [No name given], 1057 Hanrei taimuzu 87 
(Matsuyama D. Ct. Dec. 15, 2000)(Ikata); Aizawa v. Murata, 1164 Hanrei jiho 3 (Mito D. Ct. June 25, 
1985), affirmed in relevant part, 1754 Hanrei jiho 35 (Tokyo High Ct. July 4, 2001) (Tokai-mura); Smith v. 
Kansai denki, K.K., 1480 Hanrei jiho 17 (Osaka D. Ct. Dec. 24, 1993) (Takahama); Shigeno v. Hokkaido 
denryoku, K.K., 1676 Hanrei jiho 3 (Sapporo D. Ct. Feb. 22, 1999) (Tomari-mura); Nagasawa v. 
Kumagaya, 1489 Hanrei jiho 19 (Niigata D. Ct. Mar. 24, 1994), affirmed, 52 Somu geppo 1581 (Tokyo 
High Ct. Nov. 22, 2005) (Kashiwazaki).   
These are just the published opinions.  News reports indicate that neighbors have sued in other 
cases as well.  The Oct. 26, 2007, decision of the Shizuoka District Court in the litigation over the 
Hamaoka reactor can be found on the website of the plaintiffs:  www.geocities.jp/ear_tn/.   
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 Residents near other nuclear facilities have fared no better.  One group of 
plaintiffs challenged the license on a low-level nuclear waste facility.  Another group 
challenged the license to the Rokkasho enrichment facility.  Both groups lost on the 
merits.43
 
 
D.  Other Litigation:44
 1.  Land. -- Opponents have also tried to block power companies from buying the 
land they needed.  Take the planned reactor in the town of Maki in Niigata prefecture.  In 
1996, residents voted against Tohoku Electric's project, and elected a mayor opposed to it.  
He sold the site that Tohoku had planned to use to an anti-nuclear investor who then 
refused to sell.  The reactor's supporters tried to void the transfer to the opponent, but the 
courts upheld the sale.
 
45  In due course, Tohoku Electric abandoned its plans.46
 Other opponents have argued that a sale of land for use for a reactor was void as 
against the "public order and good morals" requirement of the Civil Code.
 
47  When one 
group of opponents tried to block a transfer on that ground, the utility sued.  The court 
declared reactors safe, and enforced the transfer.48
 Still others have argued that the land a utility wanted was held "in common" by 
members of the village.  Unless all members agreed to sell, the sales contract was void.  
As villagers do hold some rural land in common, the question for the courts has been 
whether a single opponent could block a transfer.  In one case, the utility sued to partition 
 
                                                 
43 [No name given], 1278 Hanrei taimuzu 97 (Aomori D. Ct. June 16, 2006); [No names given], 
1102 Hanrei taimuzu 79 (Aomori D. Ct. Mar. 15, 2002), affirmed, Hanrei taikei 28131668 (Sendai High Ct. 
May 9, 2006). 
44 Opponents can embroil power companies in litigation over a wide range of other issues as well.  
For example, they may sue the firms to force disclosure of materials related to reactor safety:  Abe v. 
Tohoku denryoku, K.K., 1452 Hanrei jiho 3 (Sendai D. Ct. Mar. 12, 1993) (disclosure required), affirmed, 
1460 Hanrei jiho 38 (Sendai High Ct. May 12, 1993), affirmed, Hanrei taikei 28060382 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 19, 
2000); Miki v. Kawaguchi, 786 Hanrei jiho 3 (Takamatsu High Ct. July 17, 1975) (disclosure required); 
Aizawa v. Prime Minister, 43 Somu geppo 1522 (Tokyo High Ct. Dec. 25, 1996) (disclosure not required).  
They sue over procedural inadequacies: Oba v. Japan, 1741 Hanrei jiho 139 (Hakodate D. Ct. July 13, 
2000).  They sue to block utilities from doing what they need to complete their license application: Iwo 
jima gyogyo kyodo kumiai v. Chugoku denryoku, K.K., 916 Hanrei taimuzu 237 (Yamaguchi D. Ct. Oct. 
11, 1995) (land survey).  They sue to block sympathetic governments from helping the utilities:  Hashi v. 
Nakanishi, 1429 Hanrei jiho 46 (Kanazawa D. Ct. Mar. 22, 1991) (environmental impact statement); [No 
names given], 45 Gyosei jiken saibanrei shu 1112 (Asahikawa D. Ct. Apr. 26, 1994), affirmed, 48 Gyosai 
reishu 393 (Sapporo High Ct. May 5, 1997) (waste disposal study). 
 
45  Takai v. Sasaguchi, 217 Hanrei chiho jiji 59 (Niigata D. Ct. Mar. 16, 2001) (dismissing 
challenge to sale), affirmed, 237 Hanrei chiho jiji 96 (Tokyo High Ct. Mar. 28, 2002). 
46 Genpatsu baburu ni tayoranai machi ye [Toward a Town that Will Not Rely on the Nuclear 
Power Bubble], Shinbun akahata, Dec. 31, 2003 (Japan Communist Party newspaper); Tohoku denryoku 
kabushiki gaisha Maki genshiryoku hatsudensho no genshiryo setchi kyoka shinsei no torisage ni tsuite 
[Regarding the Withdrawl of the Application for the Establishment of a Nuclear Reactor Electrical 
Generator at Maki by Tohoku Electric Power Co.], at METI website:  
www.meti.go.jp/kohosys/press/0004934/ 
47 See Minpo [Civil Code], Law No. 89 of 1896, Sec. 90. 
48 Shikoku denryoku, I.K. v. Tamura, 728 Hanrei jiho 27 (Matsuyama D. Ct. Feb. 2, 1974). 
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the commonly held land, and buy the section held by those who did not object to the 
planned reactor.  The court allowed the partition.49  In another case, the court held that 
the village in question did not require unanimity.  Whether a village required unanimity 
depended on local custom, and in the case in question the court held that it did not.50
 
 
 2.  Plebiscite. -- Or take the reactor complex in Kashiwazaki, 35 miles south of 
Maki.  The giant plant holds seven reactors.  In 2001, Tokyo Electric (the owner) decided 
to use MOX.  The residents took a vote, and a majority voted no.  They had no legal 
power to decide what fuel Tokyo Electric would burn.  But faced with their opposition, 
the utility opted to stay with uranium.51
 
  
 3.  Derivative claims.  Sometimes, opponents of nuclear plants have bought stock 
in the power company and filed derivative suits.  In one case, for example, Chubu 
Electric had "deposited" a large sum of money with a local fishing cooperative.  When a 
shareholder challenged the deposit, the court dismissed the claim.  Chubu would need the 
support of the cooperative in the future, it explained.  Toward that end, this was a 
reasonable expenditure.52
 Other opponents have used their status as shareholders to attend its annual 
meeting.  In at least four cases, they then decided that firm management did not pay them 
sufficient attention, and sued to vacate the results of the meeting.  In each case, the court 
dismissed their claims.
 
53
 These suits could backfire.  When one group of opponents filed a derivative suit, 
the court told them to post bond.  Said the court, they had sued in part in bad faith.  They 
were not pursuing the good of the firm.  Instead, they were pursuing their own personal 
policy (anti-nuclear) preferences.
   
54
 
 
E.  Damage Claims: 
 1.  Introduction. -- Recall that for all damages caused by a nuclear accident (other 
than because of massive disasters), the operator is strictly liable.  Plaintiffs must show 
causation, but need not show negligence.  Most published opinions on damage claims 
                                                 
49 [No names given], 1918 Hanrei jiho 58 (Aomori D. Ct. May 10, 2005). 
50 [No name given] v. Chugoku denryoku, K.K., 1933 Hanrei jiho 84 (Hiroshima High Ct. Oct. 20, 
2005), affirmed, 2007 Hanrei jiho 58 (Sup. Ct. Apr. 14, 2008).  See generally Commentary, 1269 Hanrei 
taimuzu 121 (2008).  See also Shibano v. Tokyo denryoku, K.K., 1361 Hanrei jiho 3 (Niigata D. Ct. July 18, 
1990) (Kashiwazaki reactor; in commons litigation, all villagers are necessary parties). 
51 Jijiro Kashiwazaki shi shokuin rodo kumiai rengo kai, Niigata ken Kashiwazaki Kirihama 
genpatsu 3 goki no purusaamaru jisshi no kahi wo tou jumin dohyo wo meguru genchi hokoku [Site Report 
on the Plebecite over the use of MOX in Reactor 3 at the Niigata Prefecture Kashiwazaki Kirihama Reactor 
3] (2002), www.jichiro.gr.jp/jichiken/report/rep_tokushima29/jichiken/5/5_2_02.htm. 
52 Nakagawa v. Abe, 1652 Hanrei jiho 138 (Nagoya D. Ct. Mar. 19, 1998). 
53 Matsushita v. Kyushu denryoku, K.K., 1392 Hanrei jiho 126 (Fukuoka D. Ct. May 14, 1991); 
Nakagaki v. Chubu denryoku, K.K., 116 Shiryoban shoji homu 188 (Nagoya D. Ct. Sept. 30, 1993); 
Shinohara v. Tohoku denryoku, K.K., 109 Shiryo ban shoji homu 64 (Sendai D. Ct. Mar. 24, 1993); 
Kobayashi v. Hokkaido denryoku, K.K., 109 Shiryo ban shoji homu 56 (Sapporo D. Ct. Feb. 22, 1993). 
54 Nakagawa v. Matsunaga, 892 Hanrei taimuzu 121 (Nagoya High Ct. Nov. 15, 1995). 
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concern a 1999 accident at the Tokai-mura enrichment plant, 80 miles northeast of 
Tokyo.55
 
   
 2.  The accident. -- The Tokai-mura plant fabricates nuclear fuel.  In 1999, it was 
mostly enriching uranium for conventional reactors.  This process required it to increase 
the fraction of the 235U isotope in the fuel to 5 percent.56
 In 1999, the plant agreed to enrich fuel to 18.8 percent 235U for the experimental 
Joyo FBR.  To produce this fuel, workers dissolved enriched uranium oxide.  The rules 
required them to dissolve the oxide in a special tank, transfer the solution to a buffer 
column, and then move it to a precipitation vat.  Through this convoluted process, they 
could prevent a chain reaction. 
   
 The three workers on September 30, 1999, apparently thought this procedure a lot 
of bother.  Rather than follow directions, they dissolved the uranium oxide in buckets, 
and dumped it directly into the precipitation vat.  They had done this with the 5 percent 
enriched uranium to no apparent ill effect.  On September 30, they tried it with the 18.8 
percent fuel bound for the FBR. 
 What worked for 5 percent 235U started a chain reaction with 18.8 percent.  At 
root, the workers seem not to have known what they were doing.  The plant had not 
produced the more highly enriched fuel for three years, and had not trained these men for 
the job.  They handled the 18.8 percent fuel as they did the 5, and started a chain reaction 
that ran out-of-control for 20 hours.  The resulting radiation killed two of the three, and 
exposed 400 others.57
 Prosecutors filed criminal charges against the operator JCO, several of its 
executives, and the surviving malfeasant employee.  The district court convicted them all.  
It fined the firm a trivial 1 million yen (but the firm also lost its license), and sentenced 
the other defendants to prison terms (suspended).
  
58
 
 
 3.  Liability. -- (a) The framework.  People began filing claims against JCO (the 
operator) immediately.  To facilitate recovery, JCO agreed to pay half of the claimed 
amounts before the end of the year on a provisional basis.  It would then finalize awards 
in 2000.  During the fall of 1999, it paid 5.4 billion yen in provisional settlements. 
 A year after the accident, JCO had settled 98 percent of the 7,025 claims.  The 
total cost:  12.73 billion yen.  Through the private insurer pool JCO carried the statutorily 
mandated insurance, but the contract covered only the first 1 billion yen (since raised to 
                                                 
55  World Nuclear Association, Tokaimura Criticality Accident, July 2007, www.world-
nuclear.org/info/inf37.html.  Two non-Tokai-mura cases are:  Karasawa suisan K.K. v. Nihon genshiryoku 
hatsuden K.K., 1322 Hanrei jiho 99 (Nagoya High Ct. May 17, 1989) (wholesale fish merchants lose 
because cannot show consumer boycott was tied to radioactive leak); Iwasa v. Nihon genshiryoku hatsuden, 
K.K., 1032 Hanrei jiho 87 (Osaka D. Ct. Mar. 30, 1981) (worker at reactor loses on health claim when 
cannot show irradiation). 
56 See Pickett, supra note; International Atomic Energy Agency, Report on the Preliminary Fact 
Finding Mission Following the Accident at the Nuclear Fuel Processing Facility in Tokaimura, Japan 
(1999). 
57 OECD, Tokai-mura Accident, Japan:  Third Party Liability and Compensation Aspects, Nuclear 
L. Bull., No. 66, Dec. 2000. 
58 Japan v. [no names given], 1136 Hanrei taimuzu __ (Mito D. Ct. Mar. 3, 2003). 
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24 billion yen).  It paid what it could of the excess, and its parent corporation paid the 
rest.59
 
 
 (b) Successful claimants.  Settlement talks could stall, of course.  Two nearby 
firms manufactured a fermented soybean paste called "natto."  With consumers scared of 
radioactivity, one of the firms had to close its factory for a time.  It sued JCO for 1.59 
billion yen, but the court awarded damages of only 180 million yen.  Because JCO had 
paid 213 million yen provisionally, the court ordered the firm to repay the difference.60
 The second firm also sued for lost sales.  JCO had paid it 276 million yen 
provisionally.  Because the court found actual liability of only 166 million, it ordered the 
firm to repay the 110 million yen excess.
   
61
 
 
 (c) Dismissed claims.  The Tokai-mura claimants did not all win in court.  Ibaragi 
kotsu claimed that the accident had slashed the value of its real estate developments.  To 
recover the loss, it sued JCO under both the Nuclear Compensation Act and the tort 
damage provisions of the Civil Code.   
 The court dismissed all of Ibaragi kotsu's claims.  The Nuclear Compensation Act 
did cover its claims -- if Ibaragi kotsu could prove them.  And because it covered the 
claims, it also preempted the Civil Code.  But to recover, Ibaragi kotsu had to show that 
the accident caused the value of its real estate to fall.  That, said the court, it simply had 
not done.62
 Likewise, a couple who ran a small factory near the Tokai-mura complex claimed 
that the accident had made them sick.  Again, the court dismissed their claims.  They did 
not show that they suffered ill effects caused by the accident.
 
63
 Finally, a frozen foods company claimed that the accident caused consumers to 
avoid its products.  It froze and sold shrimp, crabs, oysters, and other shellfish.  Fears of 
radioactivity, it argued, led consumers to shun its goods.  JCO had provisionally paid it 
substantial damages.  The court decided that the company had not proven its damages, 
and ordered it to repay the entire provisional amount.
 
64
 
 
III.  Ownership and Regulation 
A.  The Fukushima Reactors: 
 1.  The quake and tsunami. -- Return now to the March 2011 quake and tsunami.  
On the afternoon of March 11, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake hit northeastern Japan.  It 
struck 45 miles off the coast, 15 miles deep.  Tokyo Electric had anticipated peak 
horizontal acceleration at the Daiichi plant of 489 gal.  The March quake shook it at 550 
                                                 
59 Note that the Mito District Court would later hold that the parent corporation was not liable.  
Kono v. K.K. JCO, 2003 Hanrei jiho 67 (Mito D. Ct. Feb. 27, 2008). 
60 [No name given]v. K.K. JCO, 1960 Hanrei jiho 64 (Tokyo D. Ct. Apr. 19, 2006) 
61 Takano Fuzu, K.K. v. K.K. JCO, 1207 Hanrei taimuzu 116 (Tokyo D. Ct. Feb. 27, 2006). 
62 Ibaragi kotsu K.K. v. K.K. JCO, 1876 Hanrei jiho 34 (Tokyo D. Ct. Sept. 27, 2004), aff'd 1914 
Hanrei jiho 95 (Tokyo High Ct. Sept. 21, 2005). 
63 Kono v. K.K. JCO, 2003 Hanrei jiho 67 (Mito D. Ct. Feb. 27, 2008). 
64 Ano v. K.K. JCO, 1830 Hanrei jiho 103 (Mito D. Ct. June 24, 2003). 
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gal.65
 A massive tsunami followed.  Tokyo Electric had anticipated waves of 5.4 to 5.7 
meters.
  It could have been worse:  90 miles to the northwest, peak acceleration hit 2,933 
gal.   
66
 
  In fact, the tsunami hit the plant at 14 to 15 meters.  Again, it could have been 
worse:  elsewhere, the waves reached 38.9 meters.  As of May 2011, Japanese sources 
put the death toll at 15,000, and listed another 5,000 missing and presumed dead.   
 2.  The plant. -- The Fukushima Daiichi complex held six reactors.  Five of them 
burned enriched uranium, and one (reactor 3) used plutonium-enriched MOX.67
 The earthquake hit at 2:46 p.m.  All three reactors shut down automatically.  The 
quake may have damaged them anyway, though Tokyo Electric claimed not and as of 
May the matter remained unclear.
  At the 
time of the earthquake, only reactors 1, 2 and 3 were running.   
68
 The waves hit at 3:27.  They crested the sea-walls, and swamped the reactors.  
Because Tokyo Electric had placed its back-up generators under the reactors, they 
swamped the generators too, and swept away the diesel fuel tank.  The plant was now 
without a cooling system.   
  What is clear is that the earthquake severed the plant 
from the national power grid.  The Fukushima reactors needed outside power to cool 
them.  Cut from the grid, they had no power.  To make good the loss, plant operators 
fired their back-up diesel generators. 
 Quickly, the Daiichi reactors began to heat.  At reactor 1 temperatures soared to 
2800º C, and the fuel began to melt.  Soon, the fuel at reactors 2 and 3 began to melt as 
well.  Reactors 1, 3 and 4 leaked hydrogen.  The gas exploded, blew the tops off the 
reactor housing, and sprayed radioactive particles into the atmosphere.  A pool at reactor 
2 began to leak, and then the pools at reactors 1, 3 and 4 started to leak too.  Some of the 
radioactive liquid seeped into the ground water.  The rest ran into the Pacific.69
 The air near the reactors began to turn radioactive.  Fish caught in the ocean 
showed radioactivity.  Vegetables grown nearby became radioactive.  Drinking water in 
Tokyo showed traces of radioactive iodine.  The government evacuated 80,000 people 
from the area near the reactors, 21 workers at the complex recorded 100 mSv 
radioactivity exposure, and three went to the hospital.  At the Daini plant, one worker 
died during the disaster.  At Daiichi, two died soon, and a third died in May.  The 
   
                                                 
65 Reactor 2 was rated to 438 gal, but received a shock of 440 gal, reactor 3 was rated to 441 gal 
but had a shock of 507 gal, and reactor 5 was rated to 452 gal but had a shock of 548 gal.  See Kawai, supra 
note, at 82. 
66 Fukushima genpatsu "taju bogi" no amasa rotei [Weakness of Fukushima Nuclear Reactors 
"multiple Protections" Disclosed], Sankei shimbun, Mar. 28, 2011, 
sankei.jp.msn.com/affairs/news/110328/dst11032819280054-n1.htm; Japan Wants 3 Reactors Closed 
While Seawall Built, msnbc.com, May 6, 2011, www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42928264/ns/world_news-
disaster_in_japan/. 
67 Third Japanese Reactor to Load MOX, World Nuclear News, Aug. 10, 2010, www.world-
nuclear-news.org/newsarticle.aspx?id=28211. 
68 See Obe & Dvorak, Core of Japanese Nuclear Reactor Likely Melted, Wall St. J., May 12, 2011. 
69 See Obe & Dvorak, supra note; Obe, Leaks Probed as Japan Moves to Cool Reactors.  Wall St. 
J., Apr. 26, 2011; Obe, Tepco:  Leak Suggests Severe Damage, Wall St. J., May 12, 2011; Obe, Cores 
Damaged at Three Reactors, Wall St. J., May 16, 2011. 
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complex is littered with radioactive concrete and debris, and now holds 80,000 tons of 
radioactive water.70
 
   
 3.  De-commissioning the plant. --  At the very least, Tokyo Electric will need to 
decommission reactors 1 through 4 at the Daiichi complex.  Probably, it will 
decommission all six.  Optimists put the cost at 1.5 trillion yen ($19 billion).  Others 
suggest much more.71
 To retire the Daiichi reactors, Tokyo Electric will need first to install a new 
cooling system.  The current system does not work, and the plant needs a way to avoid a 
meltdown.  After adding that mechanism, the firm will temporarily encase the reactors in 
a flexible (but radioactivity-proof) tent.  It will then build a more permanent structure.
 
72
 Yet even "permanent" is not forever.  Tokyo Electric needs the reactors isolated 
for 300 years, but concrete does not last that long.  During the week after the March 
earthquake, the New York Times sent a reporter to Chernobyl.  In the months after the 
melt-down, the Soviet government had encased that reactor in a concrete box.  The box is 
"riddled with cracks," reported the journalist.  When it rains, water leaks in.  It turns 
radioactive, and workers then pump it out.
   
73
 
  The 15,000 square miles around the reactor 
(roughly the size of Switzerland) will not be livable for three centuries.  Instead, the "wild 
world is gradually pressing its way" back into the area.  To replace the Soviet 
sarcophagus, the Ukrainian government is raising funds.  The cost for a new cement box:  
$1.4 billion. 
 4.  Compensating victims. -- The compensation claims started arriving 
immediately.  A month after the accident, local agricultural cooperatives were filing 
demands.  For the fall in price of their vegetables in March, they claimed losses of 1.45 
billion yen.  For milk they could not sell, they asked 398 million.74
 But that was just the start.  By law -- by the Nuclear Compensation Act -- unless 
the earthquake was so massive as to exempt Tokyo Electric from all liability (a legal 
question still unclear), the firm is strictly liable for all damages caused.  By contract, the 
government is liable for the first 120 billion yen ($1.5 billion), but 120 billion yen does 
  
                                                 
70  METI, News Release, Apr. 3, 2011, 
www.meti.go.jp/press/2011/04/20110403002/20110403002-1.pdf; Mochizuki, Worker Dies at Japan's 
Fukushima Plant, Wall St. J., May 14, 2011. 
71 Kamiya & Nakano, Genpatsu baisho 4 cho en, seifu ga shisan [Government Proposes Budget of 
4 Trillion yen for Nuclear Reactor Compensation], Asahi shimbun, May 9, 2011; ANS Nuclear Cafe, 
Decommissioning Fukushima.  ANS Nuclear Cafe, Apr. 7, 2011, 
ansnuclearcafe.org/2011/04/07/decommissioning-fukushima/. 
72 Belson & Myers, Tokyo Utility Lays Out Plan for Its Reactors, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 2011; 
ANS, supra note.   
73 Barry, Lessons from Chernobyl for Japan, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 2011. 
74  Ibaragi ken nai no nochikusanhigai, Toden ni 18 okuen baishoseikyu he [1.8 Billion 
Compensation Demand to Tokyo Electric for Ibaragi Prefecture Agricultural Damages], Nihon keizai 
shimbun, Apr. 25, 2011; Genpatsu hosho, kuni ga futan mo [Country Too Will Bear Burden of Nuclear 
Reactor Compensation], Nihon keizai shimbun, Apr. 27, 2011. 
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not go far.  Estimates of the eventual total vary, but Bank of America Merrill Lynch put it 
at 2.5-4 trillion yen ($31-49 billion).75
 Tokyo Electric cannot pay 4 trillion yen.  Before the accident, it had a market 
capitalization of 3.2 trillion (Table 2).  It had total assets of 13.2 trillion yen, but after 
outstanding debt net assets of only 2.5 trillion.  
  Other observers go higher still.   
 All this makes some sort of reorganization likely.  If Tokyo Electric is legally 
liable but unable to pay, the government may pay compensation in the firm's stead.  If so, 
it will probably demand a big stake in the firm.  Perhaps it will take an equity stake, or 
perhaps it will take a debt stake with effective control.  As of mid-May, plans remained in 
flux.76
 
   
 5.  The seismological context. -- Recall the historical discussion from the outset of 
this article.  In four centuries, five earthquakes have stuck the area with at least 
magnitude 8.  The 2011 quake came 78 years after its magnitude 8.1 predecessor, and 
that one arrived 37 years after an 8.0 quake.  At 38.9 meters, the 2011 tsunami was 
almost exactly as high as its 1933 predecessor.   
 At root, the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami were not large-magnitude, low-
probability disasters; they were large-magnitude, very-high-probability disasters.  
Seismologists could not have predicted them for 2011, but they could predict them for the 
first half of the century.  They could not have predicted the 9.0 magnitude, but they could 
predict at least 8.  They could not have predicted a 38.9-meter tsunami, but they could 
predict at least 20. 
 The point is simple:  the fault off-shore from the Fukushima nuclear complex 
causes massive and frequent earthquakes.  Low-probability events like a 9.0 earthquake 
can be hard to anticipate.  But the issue was not whether Fukushima would see a 9.0 
earthquake.  It was whether it would see an earthquake of at least magnitude 8.0, and the 
answer was "yes."  It was whether it would see a tsunami at least 20 meters high, and the 
answer was "yes."   
 
B.  Private Ownership: 
 1.  Moral hazard. -- Tokyo Electric wildly underplayed the risk of a large 
earthquake and tsunami, but it did not underplay it carelessly or negligently.  It 
underplayed it rationally -- wildly, but rationally.  By incorporating, it limited the extent 
of its liability to the fire-sale value of its net assets.  Beyond that amount, any losses fell 
on its victims -- or, if the government so chose, on taxpayers.  Once losses climbed 
beyond its fire-sale value, Tokyo Electric escaped all liability. 
 This moral hazard inheres in all privately owned nuclear power companies.  
These firms are corporations and, necessarily, enjoy limited liability.  Cause a disaster, 
and they face liability capped by the value of their net assets.  Beyond that amount, they 
pay nothing.  Necessarily, they have no incentive to limit damages beyond the value of 
those net assets.  For risks beyond that point, they capture all the returns but bear none of 
the costs.   
                                                 
75 Narioka & Sekiguchi, Tepco Rescue Plan Could Hit Investors, Wall St. J., May 13, 2011. 
76 Iwata & Sekiguchi, Japan Fails to Reach Tepco Funding Deal, Wall St. J., May 12, 2011. 
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 In most industries, this dynamic is not a problem.  Firms seldom commit torts that 
cause damages so large as to swamp their net assets.  Instead, they retain most of the right 
incentives on the margin.  Banks may have caused large losses in 2008, but most of those 
losses they imposed on the parties with whom they contracted -- and, necessarily, 
internalized the risk through the price term in their contract.  Silicon breast implant 
makers internalized any product risk through the market price of the implants.  Tobacco 
firms internalized the risk of cancer through the price of their cigarettes.  Asbestos 
makers internalized the risk of asbestosis through the wages firms paid to workers who 
handled the material, which in turn affected the price the firms paid the manufacturers for 
the insulation. 
 The problem instead arises in those few industries (like nuclear power) where 
firms can impose massive damages on people (like neighbors) who do not earn a 
contractual return for bearing that risk.  In these industries, firms impose on third-parties 
a risk of catastrophic damages that easily swamps their net asset value.  Necessarily, 
when making decisions about those investments, they will face the wrong incentives on 
the margin. 
  
 2.  Regulatory incentives. -- In theory, regulation could solve this problem.  In 
practice, it does not.  One can overstate the point:  as one political scientist put it, "the 
extent to which career bureaucrats are either socialized against the stated missions of 
their agencies, or guided primarily by venal motives, has been overstated." 77   Yet 
however overstated, the problem remains.  As George Stigler wrote years ago, regulators 
do not necessarily regulate in the public interest.  Instead, they sometimes regulate in the 
interest of the firms they regulate:  as Stigler put it, "regulation is acquired by the industry 
and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit."78
 This pro-industry bias can come from several sources.  Sometimes, regulators 
adopt the bias because firms bribe them.  Sometimes, they adopt it because the firms hire 
them after they retire.  Sometimes, they adopt it because they talk so often with the firm's 
representatives that they become genuinely convinced. 
  
 More basically, regulators regulate in the interests of the regulated firms because 
they (as agents) work for politicians (as principals).  Those politicians, in turn, promote 
the interests of the regulated firms because the firms have more intense interests at stake 
than voters at large.  Voters care about many things, but care intensely about very few.  
Because good legislation (or good regulation) is by its nature a public good, voters will 
seldom organize to promote legislation (or regulation) about matters in which they have 
but a casual interest.   By contrast, for a regulated firm the regulation may indeed be a 
private good.  The firm will care deeply about it, and will lobby heavily to shape it.  A 
power company, for example, will lobby for quicker licensing, lax oversight, and higher 
rates.  In Japan, the power companies were long a major contributor to the then-ruling 
Liberal Democratic Party.  In the U.S., power companies donate to politicians too -- and 
                                                 
77 Gordon & Hafer, Corporate Influence and the Regulatory Mandate, 69 J. Pol. 300, 302 (2007). 
78 Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 3 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 3 (1971); see 
Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. Law & Econ. 211 (1976). 
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Sanford Gordon and Catherine Hafer find that those who do enjoy abbreviated safety 
inspections at their nuclear plants.79
 
   
 3.  Judicial incentives. -- Japanese judges approve the licenses bureaucrats grant 
for the same reason the bureaucrats grant them:  in effect, judges are bureaucrats too.80
 Most Japanese judges join the courts immediately after graduating from the 
national law school.  Most then stay in the courts until their early 60s.  During their 
careers, they move through a series of posts, generally at three-year intervals.  They are 
not indifferent among them.  Some posts are in Tokyo, some in Osaka, and some are in 
provincial small cities.  Some posts are in district courts, some in appellate courts, and 
some in obscure branch offices.  Some posts are in prosecutorial bureaus, and some in the 
court's own administrative offices. 
  
Bureaucrats at METI work for politicians who regulate in part by Stigler's famous logic.  
Japanese judges work for the same politicians. 
 Among these posts, the court's personnel office (known as the "Secretariat") 
decides where each judge will go.  Judges themselves staff the personnel office.  There, 
they report to the Supreme Court.  They serve at the Secretariat on one or more of their 
three-year postings.  In this capacity, they read the performance reviews senior judges in 
the rest of the country write about their colleagues.  They then post those judges to 
positions they (at the Secretariat) consider most appropriate.   
 Japanese judges also climb the court's pay scale.  Although the Constitution 
protects them against pay cuts, it does not promise them pay raises.  Japanese judges start 
their careers at low pay.  If successful, they end their careers at high pay.  But how 
quickly they climb the intervening steps depends on how highly their colleagues in the 
Secretariat evaluate their work. 
 Necessarily, this system gives judges strong incentives to decide politically 
charged cases along the lines favored by politicians in the ruling party.  The cabinet 
names the Supreme Court justices, those justices supervise the judges who run the 
Secretariat, and the Secretariat judges monitor, evaluate, promote and punish the rest of 
the court.  By naming to the Supreme Court justices who share their policy preferences, 
the cabinet can ensure that lower court judges tend to adjudicate sensitive cases along 
ruling party policy lines.  
 In turn, the way that the Secretariat rewards and punishes judges affects the type 
of law-school graduate who applies for a judicial position at all.  On average, judges who 
decide controversial cases according to the preferences of ruling party politicians do 
better than those who do not.  In turn, this phenomenon implies that who share those 
preferences are more likely to enjoy the job of a judge.   
 
C.  Government Ownership: 
                                                 
79 Gordon & Hafer, Flexing Muscle:  Political Expenditures as Signals to the Bureaucracy, 99 Am. 
Pol. Sci. Rev. 245 (2005). 
80 See generally J.M. Ramseyer & E. Rasmusen, Measuring Judicial Independence:  The Political 
Economy of Judging in Japan (2003).   
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 Japan (and other countries) could eliminate this moral hazard if the government 
owned the power plants itself.  Private firms may use limited liability to externalize the 
risk of operating reactors, but governments do not face a liability cap.  If they operate a 
reactor and it makes money, they capture the returns for themselves.  If they operate a 
reactor and it blows up, they pay damages in full.  They capture the income, they pay the 
costs.  At every level, they apparently face the correct marginal incentives. 
 But only "apparently."  Even as governments avoid the moral hazard created by 
limited liability, they replicate it with their own.  Perversely in the extreme, the electoral 
dynamics in modern democracies give politicians nearly identical (and identically 
misaligned) incentives.  The point is not just that governments run firms badly -- though 
they do run them inefficiently.  Neither is the point that the Soviet Union handled 
Chernobyl badly -- thought it did handle it disastrously.  The point is that democratic 
governments face incentives that are misaligned on almost exactly the dimensions by 
which Tokyo Electric's incentives were misaligned in Fukushima. 
 The perverse incentives to government ownership follow from three facets of 
modern democratic government: 
 (i) The government sets consumer electrical prices.  Whether electricity is 
generated by private firms or the government, consumers do not buy it at cost.  
They buy it at prices set by the government. If unregulated firms can compete for 
segments of the market (e.g., business users), then prices in some sectors may 
start to reflect market dynamics.  In general, though, consumers will buy their 
power at prices that reflect electoral -- not economic -- criteria. 
 (ii) NIMBY politics dominate site selection.  Again whether electricity is 
generated by private firms or the government, operators will not build reactors on 
seismologically optimal sites.  They will build them on politically optimal sites.  
Because melt-downs can be bad even for politicians, seismological considerations 
will not be irrelevant -- but neither will they be all that matters.  Voters care not 
just about the probability that a reactor will explode in the abstract, but about the 
probability that it will explode in their backyard.  If the seismological optimum is 
in their backyard, they will want the reactor built on a suboptimal site. 
 (iii) "Other people" pay the cost of a disaster.  Suppose a government-
owned reactor melts down.  Citizens will not bear (A) the share of the resulting 
liability that tracks (B) the share of the benefit they received from the electricity.  
Instead, a broad range of citizens will enjoy the benefit of stable and cheap 
electricity, but only a small group will bear the cost of the liability.  Necessarily, 
politicians elected by majority vote have little incentive to equalize expected costs 
and benefits on the margin. 
 This perverse result follows straightforwardly from the logic of the 
progressive income tax.  In modern wealthy democracies, a small fraction of 
taxpayers pays most of the costs of government.  If the government is liable for a 
tort, that small fraction pays the bulk of the liability.  In the U.S., 5 percent of the 
taxpayers pay about 60 percent of the income tax; 10 percent pay about 70.81
                                                 
81  National Taxpayers Union, Who Pays Income Taxes and How Much (2011), ntu.org/tax-
basics/who-pays-income-taxes.html. 
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Japan, 2 percent of the taxpayers pay about 40 percent of the income tax; 20 
percent pay about 80.82
 As a result, most politicians represent constituents who enjoy the benefits 
of cheap and stable electricity but would not (under government ownership) pay 
much of the cost of a nuclear melt-down.  They consume a large share of the 
electricity, but for it pay only regulated (not market) prices.  Because they bear 
but a small fraction of the burden of the public fisc, they bear but a small part of 
any liability from a nuclear disaster.  Hence the moral hazard. 
  
 Among firms in competitive economic markets, the managers who survive are 
those who equalize the costs and benefits to the firm on the margin.  Investors price a 
firm's stock by present-valuing its expected net cash-flow.  If managers invest in a project 
that earns more than it costs, investors bid up the price of the stock.  If they invest in a 
project that costs more than it earns, investors bid it down.  Facing more expensive 
capital costs, the firms whose managers invest in bad projects will either replace those 
managers or disappear.   
 Among governments in modern democracies, the politicians who survive are not 
those who equalize costs and benefits to the country on the margin.  Granted, all else 
equal voters will prefer politicians who choose efficient projects to those who do not.83  
But all else is not equal, for voters can use the law to allocate the benefits among 
themselves differentially.  Shareholders cannot legally redistribute corporate wealth from 
other investors to themselves.  Voters can use the law to do exactly that.84
 The implications for nuclear power are straightforward:  voters will elect 
politicians: 
  As a result, 
voters will not just elect politicians who select projects that generate net positive returns 
for the country.  They will elect politicians who redistribute the national wealth from 
other voters to themselves.  
 (a) who will build enough plants (of any sort) to generate a steady supply 
of electricity,  
 (b) who will sell them that electricity cheaply,  
 (c) who, if they generate that electricity through nuclear reactors, will 
locate those reactors in someone else's district, and  
 (d) who will maintain a tax regime in which other people pay the bulk of 
the public fisc -- and the bulk of the cost of any meltdown.   
In the private sector, limited liability drives a wedge between the costs and returns to 
nuclear power.  That wedge then generates the moral hazard behind Fukushima.  Under 
public ownership, the progressive tax rates (coupled with rate regulation and NIMBY 
siting) similarly drive a wedge between the costs of government projects and their 
                                                 
82  Shotokuzei wa dare ga haratte iru? [Who Pays the Income Tax] (Mar. 18, 2010), 
http://zei.sagafan.jp/e198676.html. 
83 Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 97 Q.J. Econ. 
371 (1983). 
84 This is a variation on Richard Epstein's point that the "progressive tax increases the frequency 
and intensity of legislative rent seeking by increasing the expected gains of factions."  R. Epstein, Takings 
299 (1985). 
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benefits.  That wedge then generates a dynamic nearly identical to the moral hazard in the 
private sector.  
 Hence the result:  regulated electricity prices, NIMBY siting politics, and the 
progressive tax regime will combine to cause voters to elect politicians who build 
inefficiently dangerous power plants.  Given these three factors, voters will select 
politicians who rig the rate-setting process to sell themselves cheap power.  They will 
select politicians who site dangerous plants near a small minority of other voters.  And 
they will select politicians who will charge any resulting catastrophe to the public fisc -- 
and, thereby, to the small minority of taxpayers who fund the bulk of that fisc.  They will 
not select politicians who equalize the cost and returns to the country as a whole. 
  
V.  Conclusions 
 On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake and 38 meter tsunami destroyed 
Tokyo Electric's nuclear complex on the shores of Fukushima.  At the reactors, the fuel in 
the core began melting.  The reactors leaked radiation into the air.  They leaked it into the 
ground water.  They leaked it into the sea.  The result was a disaster -- but not a high-
damage, low-probability disaster.  It was a high-damage, high-probability disaster.  
Massive earthquakes and tsunami have assaulted the area every century.   
 Tokyo Electric could rationally do what it did because it did not pay the full cost 
of a catastrophic accident.  Limited liability lies at the heart of corporate law, and limited 
liability let Tokyo Electric externalize the cost of running these nuclear reactors.  In most 
industries, firms rarely undertake actions that risk tort damages so large that they cannot 
pay them.  In the nuclear power industry, that potentially catastrophic liability is routine.  
Privately owned nuclear power companies bear the costs of an accident only up to the 
fire-sale value of their net assets.  Beyond that point, they pay nothing. 
 Unfortunately, government ownership does no better.  In modern democracies, 
most voters enjoy the benefit of cheap and stable electricity.  Those same voters, however, 
bear little of the burden of the public fisc.  Because any liability from a nuclear disaster 
would fall on the public fisc, they also bear little of the burden of any liability that a melt-
down would cause.  Under private ownership, shareholders of the power companies enjoy 
the revenue from nuclear reactors, but limited liability lets them escape the full liability 
of any damages they cause.  Under government ownership, most voters enjoy the benefit 
of cheap and stable electricity, but progressive tax rates let them -- similarly -- escape the 
full liability of any damages they cause. 
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Table 1:  Principal Nuclear Power Producers 
 
 
 Elec'y Perct Number 
 Gen'd Total Reactors 
U.S. 799 20.2 104 
France 392 75.2 58 
Japan 263 28.9 51 
Russia 153 17.8 32 
S. Korea 141 34.8 21 
Germany 128 26.1 17 
 
All  2560 13.8 440 
 
 
 Notes:  The electricity generated is given in billion 
kilowatt-hours, 2009.  The percent total gives the 
percentage of electricity generated, 2010.  Number of 
reactors gives the number of operating reactors, April 2011. 
 
 Source:  World Nuclear Association, World Nuclear 
Power Reactors & Uranium Requirements, Apr. 2011.  
Available at:  http://www.world-
nuclear.org/info/reactors.html 
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Table 2:  Japanese Power Companies 
 
 
 2010 Net 2010 Total Jan. 2011 
 Oper. Prof Assets   Mkt Cap  Capacity. 
Hokkaido Electric   31.7   1,607    360  7,417 mW 
Tohoku Electric   89.3   3,919    916 15,770 
Tokyo Electric  284.4  13,204  3,204 62,200 
Hokuriku Electric   50.0    1,412    422  8,230 
Chubu Electric  200.0   5,300  1,527 32,627 
Kansai Electric  273.9   7,117  1,894 35,760 
Chugoku Electric   81.5   2,781    619  4,210 
Shikoku Electric   42.4   1,383    550  6,670 
Kyushu Electric   98.9   4,185    872 19,330 
Okinawa Electric   17.4     365     71  1,916 
 
     Notes:  All financial figures in billion yen.   
 
     Source:  Financial figures are calculated from the Nihon 
keizai shimbun. 
 
